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Abstract
Schiff and Winters  examine regional  cooperation among  and ultimately  leads to losses for all parties. Other
neighboring countries  in the area of regional  public  constraints  on reaching a cooperative solution  are its
goods.  These public goods include  water basins (such as  complexity and the financial requirements.
lakes, rivers, and underground  water), infrastructure  Two types of institutions may help resolve some or all
(such as roads, railways,  and dams),  energy, and the  of these problems.  International  organizations can help
environment.  Their  analysis focuses  on developing  with trust, expertise,  and financing.  The United Nations
countries  and the potentially  beneficial role that  and the World Bank have  been involved  in a number of
international  organizations and regional  integration may  such projects  in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere,  and have
play in  bringing the relevant countries  to a cooperative  been  successful in helping parties reach cooperative
equilibrium.  solutions. Regional integration agreements,  though not
A major problem  in reaching a cooperative  solution  is  necessary  for regional cooperation,  may also be helpful
likely to  be the lack of trust.  If neighboring countries do  by embedding the negotiations  on  regional cooperation
not trust each  other because of past problems, they may  in a broader institutional framework.  The authors
fail to reach  a cooperative  solution as each tries to  examine these issues with the support  of both analysis
maximize  its gain from the regional  public good.  These  and  a number of case studies.
strategies typically do not account for spillover  effects
This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to examine  the role
and effects  of regional  integration.  Copies  of the  paper  are  available  free  from the World  Bank,  1818  H  Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Paulina Flewitt,  room MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-2724, fax 202-522-1159,
email  address  pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  Maurice  Schiff may be contacted  at mschiff@worldbank.org.  July 2002.  (33 pages)
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Countries  can  benefit  greatly  from  cooperation  when  they  share  common
resources  such  as  rivers,  fishing  grounds,  hydroelectric  power,  rail  connections  or  the
environment.  In the presence  of economies  of scale or mter-country externalities,  market
solutions are generally sub-optimal,  and failing to cooperate can be very costly. However,
regional cooperation is not the same as regional integration,  and, indeed, there is generally
rather little connection between them.
Finding  equitable ways  to share the burdens  and benefits of regional  cooperation
can be difficult. First, countries  are sometimes unwilling to cooperate because of national
pride, political tensions,  lack of trust, high  coordination costs  among a large  number of
countries,  or the  asymmetric  distribution of costs and benefits.  Second, there  are  strong
incentives  to behave  strategically  in one-off negotiations.  Countries  that are  dissatisfied
with the potential  distribution  of benefits  may withhold their  agreement  on a particular
issue.  They can  increase the credibility  of their threatened  veto  by making investments
that  would be  useful if the  agreement  were  not implemented.  This  is inefficient if the
investments  are  made,  exploitati-ve  if  the  other  partners  concede  their  demands,  or
destructive  of cooperation  if they  do  not.  Third,  international  and regional  cooperation
agreements  are typically harder to achieve than national ones because,  given the absence
of courts  or higher  authorities to  which gto,appeal,  the--enforcement  of property  rights is
ambiguous and weak at the international  level. As a result,  international agreements  mustbe  self-enforcing,  which,  in  turn,  reduces  the  set  of  feasible  cooperative  solutions,
possibly to nothing.
Of course, solutions can frequently  be found despite these difficulties,  but at least
two types of agency can help to resolve them and so increase the set of feasible solutions
from which  countries can choose.  First, international  organizations  - such  as the World
Bank  - have  often  helped  achieve  agreements  that  might  not  have  been  possible
otherwise.  They  can  use  their  credibility,  technical  expertise,  broader  perspective,
neutrality  and  financial  resources  to  broker  and  enforce  deals  outside  the  set  that  is
feasible for the countries acting alone.
Second,  RIAs  can  be  a  help  in  cooperating  on  non-trade  issues.  To  be
implemented  effectively,  cooperation  agreements  usually  need  specialized  institutions,
including  mechanisms  to  enforce  the  provisions, to  deal  with disputes  on how to  share
benefits,  and  to  deal  with  changes  in  situations  that  require  the  renegotiation  of
agreements.  While the institutional  framework  can be tailor-made for each agreement,  a
wider  set-up  shared  by  a  whole  set of  agreements  could  be  both  cheaper  and  more
effective.  Also, the ties of collaboration  and frequent interactions  at policy-level provided
by  some RIAs  generate  practice  in  shared problem  solving  and can raise  the degree of
trust among the parties. Moreover,  RIAs can also help by putting more issues on the table
and  embedding  them  in  a  wider  agreement,  which  both  lowers  the  size  of  the
compensatory  transfers  required  to  get  agreement  on  particular  issues  and  makes
enforcement  more  effective.  This  last  case  is  basically  the  only  intersection  between
regional  cooperation  and  regional  integration,  and  it  can  be  inferred  that,  although
2assisting cooperation  may  add to the benefits of forming an RIA, only very rarely will it
be the principal motivation.
Two  important  illustrations  of the  potential  for  regional  cooperation  in  which
partial cooperation has been achieved but full cooperation proved impossible are:
*  Egypt  and Sudan who  ignored  upstream users  in their  1959  bilateral  agreement  and
allocated the Nile's total flow of water to themselves-even though cooperating  with
the other riparians could have generated more irrigation water and electric power; and
*  The Indus River Basin, where intervention-backed  with financial assistance-by the
international  community helped India and Pakistan draw up a plan to share the waters,
although  continuing  tension  has  so  far  prevented  them  from  undertaking  the joint
developments that could provide additional benefits for both countries.
In fact, international  water resources - where externalities  are pervasive, property
rights  are  contested,  and  gains  from  cooperation  can  be very  substantial  - are  the most
common  subject  of international  cooperation  agreements.  More  than  280  international
treaties  have  been  signed  on  water  issues,  two  thirds  in  Europe  and  North  America.
Without  cooperation,  lakes,  rivers  and  seas  are  vulnerable  to  the  "tragedy  of  the
commons" in which each user tries to maximize its own benefits from a resource without
paying attention to the effects on other users.  This leads to overexploitation-to  depleted
fish stocks, pollution or lower water levels-that harms all users.
River  basins  are  also,  however,  sources  of continuing  international  tension:
upstream water use,  pollution,  deforestation  or  over-fishing  can  lower the  quantity  and
3quality of water and fishing downstream.  Often, up- and downstream  countries can both
benefit directly  from cooperation  - i.e.  compensation  is not necessary for either party to
show  a positive  return.  For  example,  building  a  dam can  help  to  regulate  water  flows
downstream,  reducing the likelihood of flooding or siltation. A dam might not provide the
upstream  country enough direct benefits to justify its construction, but that might change
if it  could  sell electricity  or  irrigation water  to  the  downstream  neighbor.  Similarly,  an
upstream  country  might  benefit from-and  may help  to  finance  through  investment  or
user fees-downstream port facilities.
This paper  makes  many of its  main points by reference  to water  issues,  but  we
also  consider  briefly  two  other  areas  in  which  cooperation  can  benefit  all  parties  -
pollution control and transport. Pollution pays no attention to national  boundaries; once it
crosses them amelioration  usually requires that all the affected countries work in concert.
Transport  cooperation  ranges  from  agreeing  to global  air transport  standards  and  rules
under  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization  to bilateral  cooperation  to  provide
rail, road, and water corridors to landlocked countries.
1  Making International Cooperation Work: Multilateral Agencies  Can Help
Unbalanced  costs  and  benefits,  and  the  frequent  need  for  lumpy  front-end
investments  can  make  it difficult  to  reach  cooperative  agreements.  Whether  the  gains
from cooperation  are reciprocal or not, international cooperation agreements must be self-
enforcing,  usually in  isolation,  but occasionally as part of a broader  package.  Countries
will join in an agreement only if they obtain positive gains, and probably also only if they
4feel  they  will  get  fair  shares  of the  overall  gains.  These  are  essentially  questions  of
expectations.
1.1  Trust is better than Punishment  if you can create it
One  basis of expectation  is  a country's  ability to  punish its  partner if the  latter
defects from an agreement.  Such a strategy can enforce  an agreement that provides greater
benefits  to  each  partner  than  either  could  get  by  first  defecting  and  then  bearing  the
punishment  that the  other imposed.  The success  of such strategies  clearly  depends  on a
host of technical  issues specific  to each  particular case,  but economically  we know that
cooperation  will be more likely the more patient countries are (the more they value future
benefits  relative  to  the  short-run  gains  from  defection)  and  the  more  credible  the
punishment strategies.  The last, in turn, requires that after a defection the other party does
not suffer  too  much  itself from imposing  punishment  rather than  merely  accepting  the
sinner  back into the fold  and resuming  cooperation.  Unfortunately,  many projects  yield
almost nothing if there is not full cooperation,  so unless the punishing-state  is willing to
effect punishment in other spheres of interaction,  there is rather little it can do to hurt the
defector.  If both parties are  in this situation,  it is clear that punishment  strategies  do not
provide  the means  for independent  self-enforcement,  and countries  find themselves  in a
so-called prisoners'  dilemma.
Punishment  generally  becomes  more  difficult to effect  the more parties  there  are
to an agreement.  Other than when there is a hegemon - a powerful  country willing to bear
the  burden of enforcement  on other  smaller countries  - a free-rider  problem  can  arise.
Each state hopes  that, in the event of defection, the others will bear the cost of imposing
5the punishment,  while it continues to operate  normally.  A potential defector that detects
this problem among  its partners will  place a correspondingly  lower probability on being
effectively disciplined.
These strategic problems  do not merely afflict agreements  once  they are  in place
but  pervade  the  negotiation  phase.  Each  partner  makes  an  assessment  of the  likely
enforcement problems,  and  will decline  to join an agreement  that it considers  flawed  in
that  respect.  Even where  a country  is willing  to  proceed  with  an  agreement  because  it
believes enforcement is feasible, it will be tempted to 'play games'  during negotiation.  An
important example of this is making - or threatening to make - investments  that increase
the  value  of the  'outside  option'  - i.e. that improve  the  country's  welfare  if there  is no
agreement.  Barrett  (1994)  shows  how,  by means of such  a strategy,  British  Columbia
extracted  better  terms  from  the  USA  in  the  Columbia  River  Agreement.  Late  in  the
negotiations,  indeed after the Canadian and US federal governments had agreed on terms,
the provincial government of British Columbia threatened to build an alternative project.
This  led the US  government to renegotiate  the agreement  and  offer better conditions to
Canada, and hence to British Columbia.
While  it worked  in this  case,  such opportunism  can frequently  be very costly.  If
the  alternative  projects  are  built,  the partners  are  left  either  with no  agreement  and  a
second-best  solution to the  problem or an agreement plus redundant  investment.  On the
other  hand,  if the  alternative  projects  are  not  built  and  the other  partners  concede  the
aggressor's  demands, we get  efficiency in an allocative  sense  (no wasteful  activities  are
undertaken),  but  the  seeds  of future  frictions.  Even  though  it  is  reasonable  to  expect
6countries  with  better  outside  options  to do  better  in  a negotiation,  naked  opportunism
sours relations  and makes future cooperation more difficult.
The  alternative  to  explicit  punishment  strategies  is  trust.'  Agreements  often
involve  transfers  among the cooperating  countries,  and without them  one  or more  may
lose compared to the non-cooperative  situation-or feel that its benefits are unfairly small
compared  to  those  obtained  by its  partners.  In most cases,  there  are no  courts  or other
authorities  to  which countries  can  appeal,  so  those that  stand  to lose (or  feel  they are
treated unfairly) in the absence of compensation  are unlikely to enter an agreement unless
they are quite sure that they will be compensated.  Countries sharing a resource may all be
willing  to cooperate and  share  the gains  from  cooperation  equitably,  but if they believe
their  potential  partners  are not,  they  are unlikely  to reach  a cooperative  solution.  This
failure  to cooperate  is not  due  to  an unwillingness  to  share,  but to  an unwillingness  to
trust.  Solving  this  problem  requires  a  credible  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  future
transfers the countries agreed on are actually forthcoming.
Box  1 Institutions for Regional' Cooperation: The US-Canada Water Commission
The US-Canada  International  Joint. Commission  is widely  seen  as successful  in
trans-boundary  water  management:  it  implements  the  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  signed
betweei  the  US- -and Canada in 1909. Narl'y  all the,cases  referred to the IJC have  been
resolved uhanimously.-
One can debate whether  trust is merely a generalized punishment  strategy defined  over many  issues  with
tolerant trigger points before punishment  is imposed.  We shall merely assume that it has some independent
existence.
7The  US and Canada  share more than  150 bodies of water along their 8,000-kfi
long  border,  including  the  Columbia  River  and  the  Great  Lakes.  Extensive
industrialization  in  the  Great  Lakes  region  has  led  to  serious  pollution  of  the  US-
Canadian waters.
The  two  governments  originally  intended  IJC  to  focus  on  regulating  water
supplies  on  either  side  of the  border,  but  today  it  coordinates  cooperation  on  water
pollution in boundary  waters  and trans-boundary  rivers,  on air pollution, and apportions
water flows and levels (to ensure navigation).
The IJC is an independent  body, seldom divided along national lines even early in
its existence.  It operates by majority  rule. It is has six non-tenured commissioners, three
appointed  by each country.  It  also depends heavily on an extensive  network  of advisory
boards, task forces,  and working groups whose members are borrowed from federal, state,
and  provincial government  agencies.  Other advisors come from academia,  industry,  and
environmental  organizations.  These  advisory  councils  do  not  receive  any  instructions
from  national  government  agencies,  and  their  members  do  represent  their  home
institutions.  Canada  and  United  States  share  all joint  expenses  of the  IJC,  including
providing the financial, scientific, and engineering resources required by these groups.
Reaching  well  beyond  its  initial  quasi-judicial  role,  the  LTC  is  a  science-based
institution that expends  much effort  on scientific  investigations,  most of which involve
environmental  concerns. The commission's members know that its credibility depends on
the strict application of technical  standards.  In addition to its reputation for impartiality,
political sensitivity has also contributed to the IJC's continued  effectiveness as an advisor
8to the  two  governments.-In  its  role  as watchdog  over  the  Great  Lakes  Water  Quality
Agreement, the IJC has sternly criticized the American and the Canadian governments  for
their  lack  of progress  while  being  careful  not  to  cross  the  line  into  environmental
advocacy,  which could erode its influence.  The expansion of UC's role beyond its initial
mandate  is perceived  to have  helped Canada and the US  deal with various parts of their
trans-boundary problems.
Trust is probably most important in situations where some partners  expect to lose.
This  was the  case  with the  development  of the  waters  of the Nile:  Egypt  and  Sudan's
unwillingness  to trust Ethiopia to  deliver the  electricity  and water  that would  make the
efficient solution acceptable to them led them to pursue a second-best solution - building
the Aswan High Dam (Box 2). They were able to agree to the latter jointly partly because
they  were  on  better  terms  politically  - for  example,  both  are  Moslem,  and  Sudan
supported  Egypt  in  its  conflict  with  Israel  - and  partly  because  the  Aswan  solution
naturally delivered positive returns to both countries
Trust is possibly somewhat  less important when there are reciprocal  externalities,
i.e.,  when all participants gain from cooperation,  and transfers are not needed to guarantee
positive  returns.  Then  agreements  are  self-enforcing.  This  seems  more  likely  where
countries  confront the problem relatively symmetrically,  for example where they share a
lake rather than being  located aiong a river course,  and where  inaction  imposes costs  on
all countries.
9Institutions to Foster Trust
It seems obvious  that anything that can foster trust in international  agreements  is
likely to  be pretty  valuable  because  it  will  enlarge  the  set of feasible  alternatives.  Joint
institutions  to  study  the  costs  and  benefits  of  cooperation  and  examine  potential
cooperative solutions  have often proved helpful  in providing transparency and increasing
trust.  Ideally,  such institutions  should  be made up of independent  experts  from  all the
countries involved. Even if they are limited to economic analysis to quantify the costs and
benefits for all parties,  they can be important in moving the consultative  process forward
and developing a shared vision as the basis for a program of cooperation.  The US-Canada
International  Joint Commission  (IJC)  is such an  institution,  and  has  been  successful  in
regional water management (Box  1).  One of the lessons for countries seeking to emulate
it is to do nothing to undermine its independence through, for example, trying to influence
its decisions  for short-term gain or make unsuitable appointments.  This is not necessarily
an easy prescription to  follow, particularly  if the governments  themselves  are  insecure  or
constitutional  institutions are fragile.
International  organizations  can  also  participate  in,  or help  create,  institutions  to
foster  trust.  International  water  bodies  require  integrated  management.  Basin states  and
organizations  in developing  regions  may not have  the  capacity  to develop  and  manage
their own shared water resources.  They may lack  information,  expertise,  or the financial
capacity  to  follow  through  with  planning  and  operations.  External  assistance  and
encouragement  can  be  valuable,  and  sometimes  essential,  ingredients  in  establishing
international  water agreements.  The international community has often provided technical
10and  financial  support  to identify  the benefits  available  from  cooperation  and  draw  up
mechanisms  for  sharing  costs  fairly.  Moreover,  the  international  community  may  be
willing to provide financial aid for regional cooperation that might not be available  in the
absence of cooperation.  The authority,  neutrality,  expertise  and global experience  of the
World  Bank and UN agencies  have  allowed  them to take  a leading  role in this process,
aided, of course,  by their ability to mobilize  financial  support.  Several examples  of such
contributions are discussed in the rest of this section.
Box 2 The Costs of Non-Cooperation  along the Nile
The  10  countries  lying  along  the banks  of the Blue  and  White  Niles  - which
include  seven of the ten  poorest  countries  in the world  - gain hundreds of millions  of
dollars  worth  of water  by  cooperating*.  Butiunder -a 1959  treaty,  which included  the
building of the Aswan High Dam, Egypt  and Sudan allocated  the total yearly flow of the
two rivers (averaging 84 billion cubic meters).to themselves.
But building dams upstream along Ethiopia's Blue Nile - where rocky mountain
soils  and narrow gorges  would reduce  seepage  and evaporation  by 50%  - would  have
increased  the  available  water by  an  estimated  6  billion cubic  meters  or  more.  As  the
shadow  price of water in the Middle East is estimated at $0.10/cubic meter (Fisher et al.
1996),  this  cooperation  would  have  been  worth  $600  million  p.a.  to  Ethiopia  and  its
downstream  neighbors.  Such co-operation  would  have  also  allowed  elimination  of the
antiquated  Jebel Auria reservoir  on the  White Nile (that serves mostly for hydropower),
further reducing  evaporation  losses.  And the  water  stored  in Ethiopia could  also  have
been  used to generate kthree  times  more hydropower than produced  by the! Aswan Damn.While  'this is  far beyond  Ethiopia's needs  for the  foreseeable  future,  the, excess power
could have been sold to meet the needs of Egypt and Sudan.
The  problems  with  reaching  a  cooperative  solution  included  the  unbalanced
distribution  of benefits  and costs, with Ethiopia  gaining US$  1.2  biiiion and  Egypt  and'
Sudan both losing US$  300 million,  and Egypt and Sudan's dependency  on water supply
from Ethiopia. This asymmetry could clearly have been addressed  by transfers leaving net
gains  all  year  round,  but  Egypt  and -Sudan  did  not  seem  to  trust 'Ethiopia  to  make
appropriate  transfeis  and/or water deliveries'in the  future. Egypt and  Sudan, on the other
hand, were traditionally close (religiously  and politically) and thus found it. easier to agree
between themselves.
The  countries  of the  Western  or  White.Nile'are  Burundi,- Democratic  Republic  of
Congo,  Kenya,  Rwanda,  Tanzania  and:Uganda;  those of the  Eastern  or Blue  Nile  are
Eritrea and.Ethiopia.  Sudan and rgypTx  receive water from both sources.
1.2  Water Basins
i iere is a compelling case for cooperation among riparian countries sharing major
water basins. More than 200 river basins covering more than 50%  of the earth's land area
are shared by at least two countries.  With the rapid population  and economic  growth of
recent decades, water use conflicts  are becoming more important;  a quarter of the world's
population  is  expected  to  face  severe  water  scarcity  in the  next  25  years,  even during
years of average  rainfall  (Serageldin,  1998).  The Nile River basin,  located  in an area of
12acute  water shortage  and connecting  some  of the  world's poorest  countries, is a telling
example of the losses arising from a lack of cooperation (Box 2).
But  cooperation  in  sharing  water  resources  across  national  borders  is  often
difficult.  Property rights, even within nations, are often unclear or contested.  The situation
is even more fraught with difficulties  when sovereign nations contest those rights and the
direct benefits  from  developing resources  are unbalanced.  All these factors constrain the
set  of cooperative  market  solutions,  and  make  it  less  likely  that  the  solution  which
maximizes the sum of the benefits  for all the countries involved  can be achieved.  These
are precisely the types of situations where international  organizations can play a vital role
in helping the countries concerned reach a cooperative solution.
International  law  offers  potential  water  basin  cooperators  at  least  four-
conflicting-bases  for  negotiating  each  country's  right  to  use,  abstract,  or pollute  its
sovereign section of a water basin. Upstream countries-quite understandably-prefer  the
principle  of "unlimited  (absolute)  territorial  sovereignty,"  which  allows  them to  pollute,
over-fish  or change the course of the river without regard to the effects on the quantity or
quality  of water  or  fish  downstream.  The  doctrine  of "unlimited  territorial  integrity,"
preferred  by downstream  countries,  states  that the river  belongs equally to all riparians,
and that upstream countries  may not do anything to affect the river's water downstream.
A third  legal  doctrine,  "prior  appropriation,"  gives water  rights to the entity  that is the
first  (in time) to use them. And a fourth, "reasonable  share"  or "equitable use"  criterion,
favored  by  the  UN's  International  Law  Commission,  expresses  respect  for  a riparian
13country's sovereign rights within its territory,  but requires  it to ensure  reasonable shares
for other users.
An  example  of successful  international  cooperation  concerns  the  Rhine.  Some
40%  of the salt pollution of the  Rhine came  from a single potash  mine  in Alsace,  which
was  hurting  Dutch  agriculture  downstream.  The  solution  entailed  funding  from  the
French, the Germans, the Dutch  and the  Swiss.  The upstream  Swiss had nothing to gain
directly,  but,  given  the  fact  that the  Rhine  runs  through  their  country,  they  decided-
based on the principle of "solidarity" as defined by the OECD Principles of Transfrontier
Pollution-that it was worth contributing  to the costs of the cooperative  solution. There
seems  little doubt that cooperation  is easier when the partners are richer and more  stable
than otherwise,  and possibly that democracy helps as well.  In part this greater ease might
reflect  the  higher  value  that  richer  countries  place  on  environmental  cleanliness  in
general,  but more likely it stems from the longer time horizons that stability induces,  the
generalized trust between  similar nations,  and the  greater  sophistication  of their dispute
settlement  traditions in general.  In addition,  three of the  four countries  belong  to a RIA
where cost of failure is likely to be higher since it is likely to affect ability to successfully
negotiate other deals or trust existing deals.
Sponsoring Successful Cooperation.
As stated  earlier,  in many cases countries  sometimes  need  external  help  to reach
agreements.  International  agencies  have frequently provided the  expertise, financing,  and
broader viewpoints  needed to  make  bilateral  water  basin cooperation  work.  In the  Aral
Sea  Basin,  solving  the  problem  of river  water  diversion  and  extreme  environmental.
14degradation  would  not have  been  possible  without  their  support.  The  Aral  Sea  Basin
extends  over  690,000  km2  in the  five  Central  Asian republics  of Kazakhstan,  Kyrghyz
Republic,  Tadjikistan,  Turkmenistan,  and  Uzbekistan.  The basin is formed by the Amu
and Syr rivers, two of the  largest in Central Asia, and has three distinct ecological  zones:
the mountains, the deserts, and the Aral Sea with its deltas.
The  Aral  Sea  was  once  the world's  fourth  largest  inland  lake,  covering  68,000
kM2.  Today it is a saline lake, with less than half its 1960  surface area due to nearly total
diversion of Amu and Syr river flows for irrigation.  The draining of the sea, destruction of
its  ecosystems,  and  pollution  of surface  and  groundwater  due  to  inefficient  irrigation,
inadequate  drainage,  and  excessive  use  of chemicals  on  cotton  and  rice  crops,  have
caused serious environmental and health problems.
UNEP began working on environmental  issues in the Aral Sea basin in 1989, and
issued  an  action  plan  in  1992.  A  World  Bank  mission  later  that  year  recommended
stabilizing  the  environment  of  the  sea,  rehabilitating  the  disaster  zone  around  it,
undertaking  comprehensive management  of its waters,  and building  regional  institutions
to  carry  out  these  programs.  The  five  riparian  states  agreed  to  joint  cooperative
management of the Aral Sea's resources,  and  signed an intergovernmental  agreement  in
February 1993.
The World Bank-l  {NEP, and UNDP organized a seminar in Washington in April
1993  to mobilize  aonor-;support.  A program  for donor  financing  was prepared,  and  the
republics  established  three  regional  organizations-the  Interstate  Council,  the
International  Fund for Aral  Sea,  and the  Executive  Committee.  A donor's  meeting  was
15held in May  1994 in Paris at which both bilateral and multilateral money was contributed.
The republics  then took a major step to resolve  one of the most crucial problems in the
region-jointly  managing  the  water  resources-by  establishing  the  Inter-Disciplinary
Coordinating  Water Management  Commission, which directly manages  water resources.
The  Commission-selected  from  the  leaders  of  each  country's  water  management
bodies-draws  up yearly water consumption  shares  for each of the states  and the entire
region.  It has two  working executive  and control bodies,  the Syr Darya and Amu Darya
Water Management Associations, which are funded jointly by all five states.
While it is clearly too early to be sure, this approach to rehabilitating the Aral  Sea
looks as if it is working well. As a result of the Management  Commission's  efforts, flow
discharge to the  Aral  Sea rose by more than  160%  in the  very first year  (Kipshakbaev,
1993).
International  sponsorship is particularly necessary when the countries that share a
resource  are  less than friendly.  The international  community brought Thailand  and Laos
together to share the hydropower resources of Laos' Nam Ngum River-a Mekong River
tributary-despite  poor  relations  and  mistrust  between  the  two  countries.  As  far  as
institution  building  was  concerned,  the  Mekong  Secretariat,  which  was  established  in
response  to  international  pressure,  provided  a forum  in which  Laos  and  Thailand were
able  to agree  to  develop  the river's hydro  potential.  The  UNDP  and  Japan  financed  a
feasibility  study and the project was built with grants from Australia,  Canada, Denmark,
France,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand  and the United  States.  The World  Bank
administered  the  funds  and  supervised  implementation.  Most of the power  output  was
16intended for use in Thailand because  demand in Laos is very limited. The project proved
to be financially  viable despite charging  low tariffs: it provided cheap power to Thailand
and  an  opportunity  for Laos  to earn  substantial  foreign  exchange  (Kirmani  and IWRA
1990).
The  international  community  also  helped  overcome  seemingly  intractable
problems  between  India  and  Pakistan  over  the  waters  of the  Indus  River.  India  and
Pakistan were unable to agree on a division of the Indus River Basin waters after the  1947
partition, and tensions between them rose a year later when India diverted water needed to
feed Pakistan's  irrigation  system.  In the  early  1950s  the  World  Bank - aware  that the
wide  gap  between the  positions of the two precluded the joint  development  and use of
water resources of the river basin as a single unit - offered  help to resolve the dispute.  In
1954,  the Bank proposed  a solution  based on dividing the Indus and its five tributaries.
The  proposal  allocated  the  three  eastern rivers  (Ravi,  Beas  and  Sutlej)  to  India and the
three western  rivers (Indus,  Jhelum  and Chenub)  to Pakistan;  a  system of canals was to
transfer  surplus water from the western rivers to compensate  Pakistan for the net loss of
access that the scheme entailed.  India was asked to pay the cost of replacement works.
But further studies showed that there was not enough surplus water in the western
rivers  to  replace ;alif  fltigation uses  on the  eastern ones,  so  that storage  dams  would be
required.  The' cost of the -system of canals and storage dams was large, and India disputed
the need for the latter.
The Bank recogimzed  that it would be virtually  impossible to resolve the dispute
unless financing  was  made available  for the huge cost of replacement  works.  Australia,
17Canada, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Italy and United States established the
Indus  Basin Development  Fund to finance the works. Thus,  after more than a decade of
conflict,  the  September  1960  Indus  Water  Treaty  divided  the  Indus  river  and  its  five
tributaries. The Indus Basin Development Fund was administered by the World Bank and
the system of works was successfully completed by Pakistan within the  1  0-year transition
period  specified  in  the treaty.  While  India  and Pakistan  have  implemented  the  treaty's
provisions  faithfully,  greater trust would have permitted  their cooperating on joint water
development  projects that would have benefited them even more.
1.3  Pollution: Facing Down  the Cruise Lines
Sometimes  cooperation  is the only way to meet  a problem.  The  Organization  of
Eastern  Caribbean  States2 (OECS)  states  are  small  island  economies  with  fragile
ecosystems  that  depend  on agriculture  (mainly  bananas  and  sugar)  and  tourism  for the
bulk of their foreign exchange earnings. The quality of the environment, and in particular
the marine environment,  is vital  to their prosperity-and  the Caribbean  has come under
increasing  pressure from solid waste dumping  on land and by ships at sea.  Much of this
solid waste  washes  up  on  the beaches,  and  threatens  to damage  the flourishing  beach-
based  tourist  industry.  This  debris  also  causes  permanent  damage  to  the  unique  and
fragile coastal  and marine  ecosystems  of the  Caribbean  Sea.  The Cruise lines, however,
which  are  among  the  worst  offenders  for  ocean  dumping,  had  warned  the  OECS
governments  that  any  island  that  imposed  waste  disposal  charges  would  lose  cruise-
tourism because the lines would merely call at ports on different islands.
18St. Lucia Prime Minister  John Compton recognized that the OECS  states needed
solidarity  to  face  down  the  cruise  lines.  In  the  early  1990s  he  brought  the  OECS
secretariat together to draw up a joint plan to improve the waste management and disposal
systems  in all the islands,  and equip the  ports and harbors with facilities to handle ship-
generated wastes. The secretariat turned to the World Bank and four other external donors
for  expertise  and  financing.  Together  they  drew  up  a  package  of waste  management
investments  for  each  island  nation-totaling  more  than  $50  million-backed  by
harmonized cost-recovery legislation.
The  program had to withstand  a last-ditch  stand by the  cruise  lines, which  tried
again  in  1997  to  split  the  islands  with  threats  of boycotts.  The  donors  mediated  the
dispute-with  what one  participant  described  as "a bit of arm twisting"- and  a $1.50
charge  per  cruise  ship  passenger  was  charged  from  May  1998.  The  charge  extends  to
hotel guests,  marina visitors,  and other tourists-and will be used  to Day for and operate
solid  waste  facilities  so that  the  OECS  countries  can  meet  their  obligations  under  the
1972  International  Convention  for  the  Prevention  of Pollution  from  Ships.  The  waste
recovery  program,  which  will  be  implemented  by  private  contractors  with the  island
governments  falling  back to a regulatory  role,  is expected  to have  an  economic  rate  of
return above 20%.
While  this initiative-called  upon an existing  regional body - the  OECS - and its
Secretariat,  this  was  not  sufficient  to  achieve  a  solution.  Rather,  external  support  -
including,  in the end,  politfical support in facing down the industrial country-based  cruise
2 Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Grenada,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  Grenadines,  Dominica,  St.  Kitts  & Nevis,
19lines  - was  required.  This  suggests  that the  regional  links  established  by  the  OECS,
though necessary  to  achieve  a  solution,  needed  outside  help  to get the  members  to  act
cooperatively in this very critical area.
1.4.Cooperating  on Transport:  Essentialjor  Lana-Locxea (ountrles
Cooperation  can  also  be  vital  in the  transport  sector.  Symmetric  externalities  -
which are much easier to overcome  - arise when two comparable  neighboring countries-
such as Colombia and Venezuela,  or Algeria and Morocco-build a road or railway from
which  both  countries  benefit.  The  externalities  are  asymmetric  and  thus  much  less
tractable when the countries are not comparable, perhaps because of differences  in size-
such as with Brazil and Uruguay - or differences  in need and/or outside options - such as
with transport corridors for land-locked states. The gains from cooperation are likely to be
large for  a landlocked  country3 that needs  a transport corridor as a lifeline  to export and
import  its goods.  Those  for the  littoral  (coastal)  country are  typically  smaller,  although
still positive because  the corridor  will enhance  its access to the interior market.  Thus, for
example, if Spain and Portugal build a better road to facilitate  Spanish Atlantic exports,
Portugal  may  also use the  road  as  a corridor  to improve its  trade  with France  and  other
parts  of Europ..  Similarly,  while  some  Andean  provinces  of Argentina  may  find  it
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat.
3 There  are 27  landlocked  countries  in the  world:  2 in South  America (Bolivia  and Paraguay);  8 in Asia
(Afghanistan,  Laos,  Nepal,  Bhutan, Mongolia,  and the  Kirghiz,  Tajik and  Uzbek  Republics);  12  in  Africa
(Botswana,  Zimbabwe,  Zambia,  Malawi,  Chad,  Central  African  Republic,  Uganda,  Rwanda,  Burundi,
Niger,  Burkina  Faso,  and Mali);  and  5 in  Europe  (Luxembourg,  Switzerland,  Austria,  Hungary,  and the
Czech  and Slovak  Republics).  In some cases (e.g.  Paraguay and Switzerland)  major navigable  rivers offer
some palliative to the costs of land-lockedness.
20cheaper  to export  their  agricultural  products  through  corridors  to  Chilean  ports  on the
Pacific than to Argentinian ones on the Atlantic, the corridors also improve Chile's access
to Argentine markets.
Although  Bolivia  is  landlocked,  it  is  less  vulnerable  to  exploitation  than most
other such countries, because  it has several realistic alternative  routes to the sea.  Its least-
cost  transport  option depends  on the  location  of production  or consumption  within  the
country.  For  La  Paz,  Arica  in Chile  is the  least-cost  port,  while  for  minerals  from  the
Potosi  region,  Antofagasta  in Chile is; from Cochabamba,  the Pacific  and Atlantic  ports
are about equally costly to reach, while the Atlantic ports are cheaper to reach from  Santa
Cruz.  Bolivia  derives  considerable  security  from  its  ability  to  trade  through  both  the
Atlantic  and the Pacific, which  increases its economic  freedom and diminishes the threat
of one of its neighboring countries imposing-for political or economic reasons-barriers
on Bolivia's transit  trade.  It has sought  to exploit this by cooperating  on both sides to
ensure the development or maintenance of routes to both oceans.4
The situation is much less sanguine  in Africa. Almost  a third of the Sub-Saharan
countries  are  landlocked,  and finding  ways to facilitate  transport to the outside world  is
ve.,  .... portant  to  their  development.  The  cooperation  that this  requires  has  frequently
been complicated  by border conflicts  or internal strife  in littoral  countries.  For example,
internal  hostilities,  such  as  Mozambique's  long-running  insurrection  required  the
countries  in  east and central  Africa to negotiate  longer  and more  expensive  (and,  thus,
inefficient)  routes to the  sea.  A  1994  World Bank review  of 42  completed  Sub-Saharan
4It has also been trying to obtain a land corridor with permanent access to the Pacific Ocean.
21transport projects aimed  at improving international  transit between  eight  landlocked and
seven  coastal countries  showed mixed outcomes that often reflected problems specific  to
least-developed  countries.  These  included  inadequate  ports  legislation,  poor  cost
accounting  for railways,  and poorly organized  highway  agencies.  Even  in the case of a
direct  railway  between  their  capitals,  the  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Burkina  Faso  governments
were  unable  to  manage  facilities  efficiently.  Poor  management,  under-investment,
declining reliability and excessive tariffs drove  business from the railways  to the already
over-stretched  and  inadequate  road  system,  and  political  mistrust  between  the
governments  eventually let to splitting the railway into two separate national  companies,
neither  of which  flourished.  Rail  operations  on the  Abidjan-Ouagadougou  railway  line
were  eventually  privatized  and  have  since  turned  around  and  at  least  approached
profitability - Box 3.
Box 3  Marriage Beats Divorce:  Sharing;an African Railroad
For almost a century the jointly owned Abidjan-Ouagadougou  railway has linked
landlocked Burkina Faso-then  called  Upper Volta-to the sea  1,260  km.  away  through
Cote  d'Ivoire.  After  independence  in  1960,  the  two  countries  merged  the  public  rail
companies  on the Abidjan-Ouagadougou  linend began trymg to run a railroad together.
In  1989  they gave  up and  split  into separate.state-owned  companies  because .of critical
financial difficulties and political differences.
Within  three  years  both  countries  realized  that  marriage-cooperation-made
more sense  than divorce  when  trying to operate  a shared resource.  Dividing the railroad
into two firms had only,  exacerbated  inefficiencies,  driving up costs and driving more and
22more  long distance  traffic from rail to road  transport.  But rather than  simply remerging
two public  companies,  the  Burkinabe and  Ivoirian  governments  decided to seek greater
efficiency  by  turning  the  line  over  to a  private  concessionaire.  The  winning  bidder-
SITARAIL-was  a  consortium  that  joined  two  major  regional  freight  forwarders,  an
international  shipping line, and a railway engineering consulting firm.
The  two  governments  liquidated  their  railway  operating  companies,  replacing
them  with  "railway  landlord  corporations"  that  own  each  country's  tracks  and rolling
stock and other equipment,  which they lease  to SITARAIL.  The latter is financially  and
technically  responsible  for  operating  and maintaining  freight  and passenger  services.  It
also maintains the line's infrastructure,  and manages the real estate owned by the landlord
companies.  SITARAIL sets  its  own rates.  It pays its landlord  companies a usage fee-
varying  from  zero  to  4%  of its  revenues-for  the  rail  lines,  and  rental  fees  on  the
equipment  it  uses.  It also  pays  the  debt  service  for  loans  the  governments  or landlord
agencies take on for rehabilitation  investments.
Taking the enterprise out of the public sector helped substantially to de-politicise
it and avoid  the previous situation in which the railway had been a political football in a
generally  worsening  atmosphere.  A private company  sets rates commercially  rather than
for  policy  objectives  and  immediately  reduces  or  removes  the  concern  that  one
government  is  trying to manipulate  the  other.  With joint  management  and  a degree  of
transparency, each side can see that it is being fairly treated. This is certainly a lesson that
other developing countries could take to heart for managing transport corridors.
23Merging  the  two  operations  also  had  strong  business  advantages.  It  enabled
SITARAIL  to  cut  the  rail  line's  staffing  by  almost  half-from  3,470  to  1,815-and
achieve other efficiencies,  including restructuring passenger  services  and dropping loss-
making tasks. While the line experienced  losses in its early years, these were lower than
forecast,  and  freight  traffic  almost  doubled  in its first  year of operation.  The  rail line
stopped losing market share to road transport,  and was expected  to break even financially
within a few years.
2  RIAs as an aid to Cooperation
Achieving cooperative  outcomes is difficult at the best of times, and the existence
of outside agencies and/or a broader framework in which to embed an agreement can both
help  the  process  along.  This  section  examines  whether  tariff preferences  or  the  other
elements commonly associated with RIAs  can facilitate regional  cooperation,  even if they
are not strictly necessary for it to occur.
On several  counts, it might be easier to conclude  cooperative  agreements  among
countries  if they are  members  of RIAs.  By increasing  trade  between  member  countries
and the degree of contact and interaction between  their policy makers, RIAs might foster
greater  trust (Schifff and  Winters  1998).  RIAs also provide  ready-made  institutions  and
embed  cooperation  agreements  in  a  wider  framework  of  cooperation,  allowing-as
showed  in  Schiff and  Winters  (forthcoming,  Chapter  6)-both  more  trade-offs,  which
makes it easier for everyone to win, and permitting  more effective punishment  strategies
if they are  required.  Through  the former  route  RIAs  help in distributing  the benefits  of
24efficiency-enhancing  cooperation  by  putting  more  issues  on  the  table;  this  eases
compensation problems, because different countries  are likely to benefit in different areas.
Rather  than  compensation  going  in only one  direction as when just one issue  is under
negotiation-and  therefore  being  fiercely  contested  in principle  or  in  amount-multi-
subject arrangements tend to allow all countries to trade-off gains against losses, reducing
or even removing the need for explicit compensatory transfers. However,  while RIAs may
assist the search for cooperative  solutions to natural resource problems,  they would rarely
be justified in these terms alone.  Given the  potential  for distortion that trade  preferences
entail,  the negotiating  effort  required  to  form  an RIA  would  almost  certainly  be better
spent directly on the resource issue at hand if that were all the RIA is intended for.
2.1  Regionalism has helped cooperation in Southern Africa and North America
One  example  where  an RIA  appears  to  have  helped  is  in power  cooperation  in
Southern  Africa  (Box 4).  The  key  factor  in  this  cooperation  was  the institutional  base
provided by the Southern  African Development  Community  (SADC),  which served as a
focal  point for promoting  regional  integration  and facilitated  investments  in the  needed
inter-connection projects.
Box 4  Power Pooling in Southern Africa
The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)  was begun in 1995 to take advantage of
the  distribution  of  power  sources  in  the  region.  The  12-country  region  (Angola,
Botswana,  Democratic  Republic  of Congo,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe)  has  a large  reserve of low-
cost hydroelectricity  in its  north (especially  the -Inga Reservoir),  large  reserves  of cheap
25coal  in  South  Africa,  and  the  Kariba  dam  (on  the  Zambia/  Zimbabwe  border)  in  the
middle of the regional system, which can play the "buffer"  role.
SAPP was the first formal international power pool outside of North America and
Western Europe.  The pool covers  about 6 million  square miles and 200 million people.
While  utilities  in the  region had  been  importing  and  exporting  electricity  for decades
through  bilateral  contracts,  these  were  difficult  and  cumbersome  to  administer.  The
objective of shifting to the pool is to create a more efficient regional market. Though  it is
still  embryonic,  as  trade  volumes  are  only  3%  of production,  sector  coordination  and
(perhaps)  mutual trust among the  12 members  and their utilities was  growing as a result
of the agreement.
SAPP  is  modeled  on  the  "loose"  pools  in  Western  Europe  and  United  States,
which emphasize  constant exchange  of information  to maximize  the  cost and reliability
benefits fromtrading and system autonomy.  Rather than relying on central dispatch, loose
pools rely on long-term bilateral  contracts. arawn up with common designs  and security
standards  plus some central  services.  Unlike in the developed world,  SAPP-membership
is limited to national utilities.
Each member  must meet  its Accredited  Capacity  Obligation,  a requirement  that
each utility have capacity to cover its forecast monthly peak. Each member is also obliged
to cover emergency  energy up to six hours, to provide  automatic  generation  control and
other  facilities  in  its  control  area,  and  to  allow  'wheeling'  through  its  system  (i.e.
transmission  of sales  between  two  other  partners)  where  technically  and  economically
feasible.  SAPP  includes  most  Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC)
26members  and  is predicated  on the  latter's  institutions,  including  the  SADC  Treaty,  the
SADC Dispute Resolution Tribunal,  the SADC energy ministers, and the Technical  and
Administrative  Unit.  The  energy  ministers  are responsible  for resolving  major  policy
issues  and  the  Technical  and  Administrative  Unit  for  seeking  funding  according  to
recommendations  of the executive committee.
The pool's potential benefits  include reducing or postponing new requirements for
generating  capacity  and  reserves,  lower  fuel  costs,  and  more  efficient  use  of
hydroelectricity.  A SADC electric power.study conducted.in  1990-92 estimated a saving
of 20% ($785 million) in costs over 1995-2010.
Three  factors  were  keys  to  the  development  of the  regional  agreement:  the
availability  of  complementary  power  sources,  an  active  regional  organization  for
economic  cooperation,  and the  political. will  to support  increased  regional  energy trade.
SADC and its predecessor,-the  Southern African  Develo-nment  Coordination Conference
served  as focal  points  for promoting  regional  integration  facilitating  investments  in the
needed interconnection projects.
NAFTA  has  also  fostered  regional  cooperation  on  the  environment  by  tying
essentially  extraneous  environmental  issues  to the trade  and  investment  deal.  This  link
helped to  create the  necessary  political support  for NAFTA  in the  USA and encouraged
the Mexicans to move further on the environment than they may have done independently
in order to close the deal. The North American Agreement on Enviromnental Cooperation
(NAAEC)  was  signed  as  one  of the  side  agreements  appended  to  NAFTA  at  the  last
27moment.  It created the Commission for Environmental  Cooperation (CEC) in Montreal in
early  1994  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of the  agreement.  The  CEC  has  a  young  but
growing  conservation  portfolio,  focused  mainly  on  protecting  habitats  and  species.  A
broad  program  of cooperation  to  protect  North  American  birds  is  in place,  aiming  to
identify  important  bird  areas  across  the  three  member  countries  and  tie  them  into  a
protected  network.  A Biodiversity Information Network  is under creation,  and strategies
are  being  developed  for cooperation  in  protecting  marine  and  coastal  ecosystems.  The
CEC has also  coordinated  measures  to protect tne monarch  butterfly.  Currently,  there  is
an  active  task  force  working  to  stop  smuggling  of  endangered  species.  Under  the
program, US Fish and Wildlife officers are training Mexican officers.
There  are  also  many  examples  of cooperation  on  the  management  of adjacent
protected areas in the border region between the United States and Canada - for example,
Glacier National  Park and  its northern  neighbor  Waterton Lakes National  Park.  And in
May 1997, the USA and Mexico signed a letter of intent to cooperate  on adjacent parks in
their  border  region.  Whether  NAFTA  was  necessary  to  Canadian-US  co-operation  is
rather doubtful - after all, these two countries had already created a role-model for cross-
border cooperation  in the form of the International  Joint Commission for water resources
(Box  1). However, it presumably did not harm and NAFTA has quite probably helped on
the USA's southern border.
Where  spillover  relationships  are  potentially  exploitative,  embedding  them  in  a
wider agreement  such as a RIA  can be beneficial,  especially if the bloc includes dispute
settlement  capability.  For  instance,  the fact  that France,  Germany  and the Netherlands
28belong  to  the EU,  that they built trust through  past cooperation,  and that continued  and
expanded  cooperation is valuable to them,  may have helped in resolving the problem of
Rhine  pollution  - see  above.  On the  other  hand,  the  role  of the  Swiss  - who  are  not
members of the EU - in helping to resolve this case  suggests that the answer lies more in
democracy,  stability,  long time horizons and repeated interactions  than to preferences per
se,  although,  of course,  forty  years  of integration  may  have  helped  to  foster  these
dimensions as well.
2.2  Transportation Infrastructure does not necessarily need boosting when  an RL4
is signed
There is a common  perception that forming  an RIA needs to  be accompanied  by
additional  expenditure  on  intra-RIA  infrastructure.  This  is  perfectly  possible,  but  is,
perhaps  surprisingly,  not  inevitable.  Increased  investment  in  regional  transport
infrastructure  may be unjustified because  the increase  in regional  trade may be the result
of  trade  diversion  and  facilitating  this  by  reducing  its  costs  could  just  increase  its
economic  burden.  Specifically,  in  considering  an  infra-structure  project,  the  prices  at
which costs  and benefits  are evaluated  should reflect  world prices,  not those  internal  to
the RIA that are distorted by members' external tariffs (Box 5 provides an illustration).
Box-5  Infrastructure  Investment in RIAs
Increases  in intra-bloc  trade  volumes  within RIAs  do not necessarily  imply that
investment  in regional  transport  projects  is desirable.  Suppose two members of a small
RIA  whose  intra-bloc  trade  has  increased  are, considering  cooperation  on  transport
infrastructure.  How  should  such programs  be  evaluated  compared  to  the  alternative  of
29each country developing  its infrastructure  for trading with the rest of the world? Say each
country imports a good from the rest of the world at price  100 and applies a tariff of 20.
These  imports  fix the  internal  price  at  120,  but because  there  is no tariff on intra-bloc
trade, this is the price actually received by producers  on intra-bloc  trade. Hence,  any unit
of intra-bloc trade  (at  120)  will seem 20% more valuable  than trade  with the rest of the
world (at 100), and that will make infiastructure  for intra-bloc trade seem more attractive.
In fact intra-bloc  trade-enhancing  and extra-bloc  trade-enhancing  projects should
be  assessed  using  the  same  value  for the  same  goods traded.  Using  different  values  is
likely to result in the wrong investment and in exacerbating whatever  trade diversion may
have  already  taken place.  Moreover,  using the  post-RIA  volumes of trade  for assessing
the alternative  projects will also bias the decision,  as  these volumes  are  also  likely to be
affected by trade diversion.
Bond  (1997)  provides  a  specific  illustration  of  this  argument.  Suppose
transportation  infrastructure  is the responsibility: of the Transport Ministry,  which takes
trade policy as a given in making its assessments of the returns to investment.  When there
are tariffs, any trade that does take place creates economic  welfare not only by facilitating
consumption  of the imported  goods but by raising government  revenue  as well.  Thus  a
well-informed  and  well-meaning  Ministry  will  seek  to  boost  trade  by  investing  more
heavily in infrastructure  than if only the consumption benefits mattered.  When tariffs are
removed  on trade with partner countries,  trade  is likely to grow  and  there will be  more
pressure  on,  and  hence  higher  marginal  cost  from  using,  regional  transportation
infrastructure.  This  gravitates  towards  investing  more  on  'intra-bloc'  infrastructure.
30However, pushing the other  way is the fact.that, although there is more of it, the marginal
unit of trade is worth less because it no longer generates tariff revenue,  and so there is less
case  for using  infrastructure  to boost it. Bond shows that the balance between  these two
forces can be positive or negative according to quite subtle parameters of the demand for
goods. In particular,  he shows that if demand  curves are linear, the two forces cancel out,
so that if transportation  spending was rationally chosen prior to the RIA, the RIA creates
no presumption that it should be increased for intra-bloc trade.
These  are not all-or-nothing decisions but rather decisions about where additional
investments  should be made.  They.are  especially relevant for RIAs with coastal  member
countries where trade with the rest of the world is typically by sea while intra-bloc trade is
mainly by land. In essence,  ports are outward looking, while roads and bridges to partners
are inward looking.
Conclusion
This  paper  examined  the  issue  of cooperation  among  neighboring  countries  in
regional  public goods  such as water  basins, infrastructure,  energy  and the  environment.
Based  on  theory  and  evidence  from  a  number  of  cases,  the  paper  showed  that
international  organizations  can  help  generate  cooperative  outcomes  by  facilitating  the
solution to problems of trust, financing and expertise; and regional integration agreements
may also be helpful  by embedding  the negotiations  on regional cooperation  in a broader
institutional framework.
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